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Introduction
Marx was a man deeply entrenched in the concrete realities of human activity.
His radical engagement with grassroots political movements distinguishes him from
other historically acclaimed philosophers. Both a fastidious student of Hegel and an
outspoken, prolific journalist, Marx’s thought was uniquely placed at the center of social
movements.1
It is perhaps this unique quality of Marx that has made him a pointedly polarizing
figure, both now and during his time in the middle to late 19th century. Having radical
ideas was not outside the norm of philosophical discourse. But, Marx’s ideas and
professional experiences mobilized and instigated social change and revolution,
threatening political and religious establishments. The reason Marx’s name carries such
poignant connotation in modern America is in part the same reason he was expelled
from Paris in 1845. It is also on these grounds that a careful study of Marx is a worthy
endeavor.
While there are many places to explore nuance in Marxist thought, focusing on
his claims on religion is vital. In academic circles Marx’s contributions to philosophy are
typically associated with novel ideas on labor, alienation, and capital. However, religion
in Marx is a major skeletal aspect to his work at large, which is evident from the outset
of his life’s project. In one of his earliest and most cited writings, he claims that criticism
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of religion is a “prerequisite to all criticism.”2 Uncovering the core of Marx’s critique of
religion sheds light on the entirety of Marx’s writings.
Furthermore, an investigation into Marx’s thought on religion will bring clarity to
his ideas, which have been obfuscated on account of the polemical thread with which
he has been associated. In many cases, Marxism is equated with atheism, and atheism
is equated with a host of political connotations. “Religion is the opium of the people…” is
one of the most frequently used lines to against religious belief.3 At its face-value, this
line suggests people use religion to medicate themselves artificially--forfeiting a true
view of the world in order to bring themselves into solace and hope. Yet, there is a
much more complex story to be told around these ideas.
A careful study will show a much more complex understanding of Marx’s view on
religion. Furthermore, a careful study of religious movements following Marx will show a
more complimentary relationship between these movements and religion than both
Marx and conservative religious practitioners would suggest. Altogether, this paper will
seek, generally, to show that Marx’s ideas on religion and social change are not
diametrically opposed, but in fact, in many respects, complementary. I will seek to more
fully explicate a dialectical understanding of Marx’s view on religion, and demonstrate
through historical examples, that social change and process is not impeded by religion,
but rather they act as catalysts and energizers of change.
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Part 1
Contextualizing Marx’s work is important, as is the case for any philosopher who
ultimately responds to their predecessors. However, Marx as both a political activist and
philosopher was responding to both the global geopolitical circumstances of his time,
and the philosophical milieu. For now, we’ll turn to the political circumstances.
There is a peculiar aspect to Marx’s engagement with the political circumstances
in Germany. Namely, Marx was quite focused on a critique of the modern state, despite
Germany lagging behind in its own formation of such a state.4 Marx saw Germany as
politically underdeveloped compared to the rest of the modern world, while at the same
time, still participating in sophisticated philosophical discourse.5 While Germany was
practically lagging behind, it was ideally setting the global pace in philosophical
conversations. In the introduction to The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy or Right, Marx
explicates this peculiar dynamic in an effort to secure a foundation from which to
articulate a criticism against the modern (ideal) state.6
In The Critique Marx defines the modern state by a few central tenets.7 The first
of these tenets is that the modern state consists of a clear separation between “civil”
and “political life.”8 To more fully explain this relationship, Marx elaborates at length how
this separation is a departure from previous eras’ relationships, where political and civil
life were unified. He claims “The whole existence of the medieval classes was political;
4
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their existence was the existence of the state. Their legislative activity, their grant of
taxes for the realm was merely a particular issue of their universal political significance
and efficacy. Their class was their state.”9 Put in Hegelian terms, the particular (civil)
individuals comprising the universal state (political) were only distinguishable by
function, and not by motivating cause. That function’s purpose was solely directed
toward the state, and not to individuals themselves.
According to Marx, this separation was first completely realized in The French
Revolution, because at that time, civil classes and political classes were fully distinct,
and--as is quite evident in this example--”antithetical”. This brings to the fore the second
tenet, of Marx’s conception of the modern state. On this point Marx claims that not only
were the political and civil classes separated by their principle and motivation, they were
opposed and contrary to one another. Marx attributes “particular interests” to individuals
of civil society, and a “universal interest” of the state. Where those interests were
conflated in the middle ages, were now conflicting in the modern state.10
The philosophical context in which Marx writes is also equally crucial to fully and
completely understand how he perceives religion within his larger system. While Marx
was responding to several philosophers throughout the development of his work,
commentators on religion were a central point of focus.11 Bruno Bauer, Ludwig
Feauerbach, and Georg Hegel are the three which will be a point of focus with regard to
Marx’s thought on religion.
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The relationship between Marx and Hegel has been regarded as “one of the
most challenging problems in the history of thought.”12 In all the continuity shared by
Hegel and Marx, their pronounced divergence on the role of God may trump the entirety
of that continuity. The reason for this being that for Hegel, God is where his system
begins and ends. For Marx, the abolishment of God is also, in many respects the
beginning and end of his thought. Hegel writes in Science of Logic, “As [pure] science,
truth is pure self-consciousness as it develops itself and has the shape of the self, so
that that which exists in and for itself is the conscious concept and the concept as such
is that which exists in and for itself.”13 For Hegel, logic and truth is that which is simply
“absolute form itself.” And he continues, that “It can therefore be said that this content is
the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and
of a finite spirit.”14 For Hegel, God is the developing Spirit of the universe which
becomes realized by particular minds which conceive of God. The meta-process of
sublation finds it’s ultimate reality in the mind of God, which is itself pure selfconsciousness.15
Hegel’s work, especially in The Phenomenology is, to the least, a dense and
speculative one that outlines the holistic metaphysical reality. It is no surprise then that
God is the epicenter in that process, which is a description about the universe and
about consciousness and particular consciousnesses. Religion and God for Hegel stops
well short of any justified practical theology--or rather, the concrete activities of
12
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organized religion. Hegel’s comments on God can be summarized in this excerpt from
The Phenomenology: “God is solely attainable in pure speculative knowledge, he is only
within that knowledge, and he is merely that knowledge itself, for he is spirit, and this
speculative knowledge is revealed religion’s knowledge.”16 It is on such speculative
grounds that Marx makes his dramatic and immediate departure from Hegel.
But even while Marx makes such a dramatic opposition to Hegel’s central tenets,
there is a peculiar shared discourse, which allows Marx to converse with Hegel’s
writings with a formidable intelligibility. Marx and Hegel may have been on different
planets, but they were making paralleled observations about the heavens, so to speak.
The radical departure from the two thinkers on the subject comes down to the central
place God plays in the development and ends of human history. For Hegel, God is
imminently manifest in the idea of reason. That one can reason presupposes an
unconditioned reality (God) that exists irrespective of the subjective observer of God.17
And, what Hegel considers “fulfillment of history” is the activity of moving back and
through God, which is pure freedom. As Sidney Hook simply states, “History [for Hegel]
is the autobiography of God.”18 With that said, Hegel certainly connotes a deterministic
aspect to history as found in God. As he claims,
With this explanation, Divine Providence may be said to stand to
the world and its process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God
lets men do as they please with their particular passions and
interests; but the result is the accomplishment of-not their plans, but
his, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by
those whom he employs19
16
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The heart of Hegel’s conception of history--his formulation of divine providence--is
where we find Marx vehemently at odds with Hegel.
Historical development and process is the jargon shared by Hegel and Marx, but
the source and catalyst of this movement are at stark contrast. Marx, like Hegel, does
believe history is formed and developed in a systematic and directional way, but that
movement is centered on the heart and will of society. The base needs and humans
and the desire to live and flourish has brought about revolution and property
redistribution et al. God is not simply uninvolved in this order but is the ultimate
distraction to historical development and progress. Which is why he plainly says,
“Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a
protest against real suffering.”20 This is to say that the need for religion is conditioned
upon the fact that human suffering (through systematic economic disparity) prevails and
through the a misdirection of protest. The distressed society finds falty and unreal
emancipation through religion, according to Marx. Human flourishing cannot occur
through self-willed determination if it’s suffering is handled through abstract and nonempirical means, i.e., religion. As will be further elaborated, Marx’s critique of the
Hegelian idea of religion is axiomatic to the tenets set out in his thought.
Another prominent influence to the development of Marx is Ludwig Feaurbach.
Feaurbach, a critic of Hegel, specifically with regard to conceptions of God and religion,
develops a humanistic perspective on religion. In one of his most prominent works,
Essence of Christianity, Feaurbach makes a key distinction about (the Christian) God
contra Hegel. Hegel’s idea of God--according to Feaurbach (what he calls “speculative
20
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conception”)--holds that God is ultimate self-consciousness, an absolute kind of subject
that is necessitated by the process of sublation. Feaurbach, however challenges the
Hegelian notion that it is possible for an absolute subject to exist without the
dependency of the object--in this case human beings.21 He argues that it is not possible
for God “if he is to exist for us, to be an object to us— he must necessarily be
thought.”22 For Feuerbach, a human being’s mind is an indispensible, and therefore,
fundamental source, of the idea of God.23
“Religion is the dream of the human mind,” Feuerbach says plainly in the preface
of his novel work.24 While this terse statement may summarize the conclusions of the
Hegelian critic, by itself, it does not completely satisfy the breadth of his claims. The
essential trait which stands to contrast Hegel is that religion and the idea of God is
undeniably bound to the empirical elements of nature--i.e., humankind and their ideas.
Similar to Hegel, Feuerbach distinguished two aspects of God: metaphysical (ultimate,
absolute, highest being) and particular. However he makes a compelling argument that
the “divine predicates” are inextricably bound to the subject.25 A divine, infinite being, he
argues, is only so far known as to the knower, in this case humans. One “cannot know
whether God is something else in himself or for himself than he is for me; what he is to
me is to me all that he is.”26 It is the fallacy that divine predicates and the subject have
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real distinguishability, that leads to Feurerbach’s coined term “theology as
anthropology.”27
The influence of Ferurerbach on Marx, is not easily overstated. As Hook
mentions, in the early period of Marx’s coming of influence (1841-1845), “he was
Feurerbachian.”28 It is not difficult to conceive of Feuerbach’s appeal to Marx. He,
perhaps scandalously, turns the ultimate focus of humankind from outward and
heavenly, to inward and concrete. The extent to which Feuerbach was successful in
achieving this end is not without debate, but to have made progress toward this
direction completely disrupts the fabric of intellectual religious thought of his day. In this
way he establishes important preconditions on which Marx can expound and critique
further.
The major departure of Marx from Feuerbach is quite evident in the short work
Thesis on Feuerbach. In every major point, Marx concludes that Feuerbach has, on the
one hand, “resolve[d] the religious essence into the human essence,” but that that
movement stops short of becoming, “sensuous human activity [and] practice.”29
Essentially, while Feuerbach has made a significant and momentous development-bringing the heavens to earth--he has stopped well short of identifying the true
development of objective reasoning, thought, et al. Namely, he has not comprehended
that human beings who are couched in their concrete and social realities, develop
through “practice”.30 For Marx, the object of focus has been moved but remained caged
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in the sphere of theory and abstraction. Which is why he concludes his critique on the
note that profound, abstract, even accurate theory, is empty without any real and
significant change in the world in which those objective beings breathe, eat, and work.31
Feuerbach, according to Marx, is guilty of sharing with the lot of philosophers hitherto-namely, that they are all only theoreticians.
The final major influential figure I will examine in context of Marx’s ideas of God
and religion is Bruno Bauer. Marx, referencing Bauer states at the outset of On the
Jewish Question, “You Jews are egoists if you demand a special emancipation for
yourselves as Jews. As Germans, you ought to work for the political emancipation of
Germany, and as human beings, for the emancipation of mankind.”32 For Bauer, the
crux of the issue with religion--in this case, Judaism--was that it stymied the greater
cause of political emancipation for the German, the human being. The crux of Bauer’s
argument is that he believes the modern and true “democractic” state is undermined by
the nature of the existing “Christian State.” This state (what he calls a “non-state”), by its
own nature, grants privileges to those who abide by the sacred norms established.33 If,
according to Bauer, the Jewish people (and other religious sects) cannot relinquish their
religious commitments, then they, by the nature of a religious commitment, forfeit that
which is necessary to establish a truly democratic state, safeguarded against the
internal biases of transcendent and abstract ideals.34
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Marx, along a similarly crafted argument, criticizes Bauer’s justification for
abolition of religion--albeit with a more elongated and complex case. It is this argument,
against Bauer, where we begin to see the convergence of Marx’s criticism of “the
modern state” and the criticism of religion as the seeds unto which Marx springboards
into a positively crafted theory which became Marxism. Firstly, Marx makes a strong
case against Bauer arguing that he has constructed an argument that “raises questions
which are not part of his problem, and he solves problems which leave this question
unanswered.”35 To elaborte on the first point, Marx conjectures that Bauer is asking
whether religion (in this case Judaism) is a barrier to establishing “political
emancipation.” However, according to Marx, this is not the crux of the matter as is
exemplified by the United States’ constitution that has (at least functionally) established
a separation of church and state.36 Furthermore, Bauer raises the criticism against both
the Jewish religion and the Germanic Christian State. To Marx, this confines the issue
to a “theological one” and does not overcome what is the core of the problem--the
structure of the state iself.37 On the second point raised against Bauer, Marx claims that
Bauer has not sufficiently brought clarity on the issue of “emancipation” in general. It is
here where Marx makes a significant signpost that marks themes of his later work. He
makes a distinction between “political emancipation” and “human emancipation.” His
ultimate claim in this regard is that humans can be “unfree” in a political emancipated
state.38 And, it is further evidenced by humans practicing religion in a “politically
emancipated state” that signifies an incomplete freedom. And moreover, that religious
35
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practice, which alienates humans from their concrete realities, actually contributes to the
continuous of the State.
It is this argument that sets the stage to fully develop a view of Marx’s complex
and holistic critique of religion. The context involving his understanding of the modern
state and the critique of other Young Hegelians converges as Marx begins to explicate
his own understanding of liberation and economic theory. He takes recourse to
undermine the modern political establishment and uses religion as the voice against it.
With the aforementioned context at hand, I will now turn to understanding Marx’s holistic
critique of religion couched in the larger system. I will explain Marx’s response to
religion through several of his major works chronologically, and conclude with a
summary that connects the ideas and thought within those works.
As has already been discussed, Marx’s work On the Jewish Question, critiques
Bauer’s own critique of religion by ultimately saying the argument stopped short of
solving the actual issue human beings face in society. Namely, Marx argues that Bauer
has presented religion as a barrier to political emancipation, which for Marx, is not the
equivalent of human emancipation.39 What remains to be discussed further is Marx’s
own views on religion and the way in which it corresponds to his ideas of human
emancipation.
Firstly, what does Marx mean by “human emancipation”? To summarize Marx’s
criticism of Bauer’s idea of “political emancipation,” he says, “The limitations of political
emancipation are immediately apparent from the fact that the state can liberate itself
from a restriction without man himself being truly free of it, that a state can be a free

39
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state without man himself being a free man.”40 Here Marx leads into a second part of his
work, On the Jewish Question, where he outlines the aspects of the political state,
which cultivate a dualistic, abstract, and therefore, “individualistic” existence. For Marx,
the political (democratic) state sustains a negative relationship of humans from other
humans. It establishes a state that maintains the “rights” of “men,” as “protection”
against the world and others who may infringe on those rights.41 As Marx describes, this
is an “egoist” human--a “self sustained monad,” who is “separated from other men and
the community.”42 He offers an eloquent summary in saying that after the feudal period,
the “revolution dissolves civil society into its component parts without revolutionizing
these parts and subjecting them to criticism.”43 Essentially, the political state, while an
improvement on the previous, leaves humans in internal isolation. Without being as
explicit (at least in this work) about what a society that transcends the political state
would be, he alludes to this in using the phrase “species-being,” which aligns with
Marx’s thesis: that humans are dependent on and determined by their social existence,
and therefore with one another.
On the Jewish Question, is largely a work criticizing Bauer’s assessment of
religion as barring human beings from being freed into political emancipation. However,
in the second part of this work, Marx offers an understanding of “religion in general”
contra the particular Jewish faith, as it stands within the democratic and free state. In
this state religion becomes an aspect of the “individual man” among other aspects of
that human who composes the civil society. As Marx put it, “the democratic state...

40
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relegates religion to the level of the other elements of civil society.”44 It is an aspect of a
person that is “intermediated” by the state. For Marx, religion itself is not caustic--it is a
symptom of that which is caustic. Namely, religion in this kind of state essentially
discourages natural social relations in a positive manner. It gives credence to this
problematic social dualism, where one can worship amoung individuals, but be in the
least concerned with the fellow congregant’s social wellness. It can make disparate their
real, concrete empirical life and their abstract and intuitive life. Religion in a democraticpolitical state, is a gauge by which that state can perceive the degree to which it has the
ability to function as an intermediary to the individuals within it. It is why the United
States is able to not only have an “emancipated” state, but that that state allows for a
wellspring of religious flourishing. If one can exercise their interior life without much or
any regard for their real and empirical circumstances protected by the state, then this
kind of political establishment is successful. For Marx, lacking the acknowledgement of
one’s empirical circumstances is at the heart of the issue and the barrier to human
emacipation.
Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Critique of Right, contains one of his most (mis)quoted
epithets to date: “[Religion] is the opium of the people.”45 The first few paragraphs of this
work offer some of the most profound expressions of Marx’s understanding of religion.
Readers may often only understand opium in one way in this epithet, namely, its ability
to ease pain temporarily—not to cure. However, understand a more full extent of opium
use at the time, will illuminate a better undrstand of Marx’s use of the term.

44
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Opium in the 19th century was, to say the least, widely used for medicinal
purposes. It was used to treat a plethora of ailments and was often used by working
classes to treat a variety of illness as they often did not have the ability to see doctors.46
Marx himself used opium to treat his illness in the later part of his life. As widely as
opium was used, it had a massive capital in the marketplace and was the source of
immense profit. The natural result of this is that it was often the case that forms of
medicinal opium were diluted or compromised to sell to the working classes. Therefore,
while opium, a common and effective pain reliever and general antidote for a variety of
medicinal purposes, also was at the center of class struggle and the imbalance of
wealth distribution and corruption.
In this metaphor, Marx’s more complex and dialectical views on religion come to
light. Religion as “opium of the people,” is to say that it is at one and the same time a
relief from suffering, but it is also at the same time temporary and contaminated--it does
not ultimately cure the issue at hand. When he says that religion is both “protest” and
“expression” of real suffering, he is articulating that the conditions under which people
exist, require religion to express and alleviate that suffering.47 But what is known to
Marx and not the practitioners of religion is that it is also a protest against the need for
religion. It is to say that the squalid conditions of the working class require a fantastic
narrative which promises hope, unattainable and unforeseeable in the present life.
Most importantly, Marx’s critique of religion, especially in the Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right, is a critique that redirects his audience to a critique of the economic
and political structure of society. He writes: “the criticism of heaven turns into the
46
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criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of
theology into the criticism of politics.”48 As Andrew Mckinnon points out, Marx is not
undermining the “sign,” “heart,” and “soul,” of which religion is the container, he is
ultimately taking issue with “the conditions that require illusions.”49 Those conditions are
the situation of the poor, who have little agency in the ability to alter their own liberation
from distress and poverty. It is only natural for human beings to seek relief from those
conditions. For Marx, it is problematic that the direction in which this often happens
leaves the earth, so to speak.50 Yet, if that forcible momentum could be dislodged from
revolving around the “illusory sun,” its inertia could be harnessed in such a way as to be
directed toward a new orbit--earthlings and their earth-bound liberation.
While the “Thesis of Feuerbach” is a short and concise work, it provides readers
with a deep sense of Marx’s attitude toward Fuerbach, a critic of religion himself and
what that criticism meant for Marx’s understanding of religion. There is one basic
common thread that flows throughout this work: “praxis.”51 As already discussed, Marx
takes issue most prominently with Feauebach regarding the interior and egocentric
perspective of his anthropomorphic religion. As becomes more evident, Marx sees the
world as a series of social interactions and this lens provides the most bare perspective
of society. Which is why throughout this short work Marx is most critical in saying,
“Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human
48
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essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the
ensemble of social relations.”52 Where Marx, time and time again, separates himself
from the other Young Hegelians, especially with regard to religion, is that a criticism of
religion itself is a retreat to criticizing an empty abstraction. For Marx the reality of
religion is a byproduct of social conditions, and for it to be resolved or abolished, would
be only an indication that those social circumstances are such that they do not lend a
need for religion and illusory happiness, because that happiness is satisfied through
earth-bound resources.53
A critical element of this concise work is on Marx’s idea of “practice,” often
interpreted as “praxis.” As has been covered previously, Marx’s departure from
Feuerbach, is his inability to completely transcend idealism. He brings down “man’s
perspective” to the earth (man’s mind), but it still remains an abstraction and
disconnected from the concrete social situation of humans. “The battles that the [Young
Hegelians (Feuerbach among them)] fought were sectarian episodes in a common
religious tradition that they shared with their opponents.”54 For Marx there was a certain
kind of breaking point in the historical development of philosophy, where theory could
not adequately render significant change or development.55 For Marx any theory or
philosophical endeavor is empty, and without substance, if it does not manifest itself into
a realizable and concrete manner. Praxis, for Marx, is a crucial missing component
omitted by his predecessors--idealists and materialists alike.
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The final work of Marx’s criticism of religion I will lend focus to is “The Social
Principles of Christianity.” This work stands apart in some respects because it offers a
more rare glimpse into Marx’s (perhaps personal) vendetta with Christianity itself;
whereas in prior works, Marx situates religion as a byproduct of a greater oppressive
system, The State. Nonetheless, in this short sarcastic article, Marx uses parallels and
allegory to vividly illustrate his perspective on both economic systems and its
complementary component, Christianity.
Sarcastically, Marx argues, by its very title, that Christianty has failed to establish
any kind of liberating or justice-oriented principles.56 He summarizes this in stating that
“The social principles of Christianity transfer the consistorial councilors’ settlement of all
infamies to heaven, and thereby justify the continuation of these infamies on earth.”57
The need for some kind of reduction of the injustices plagued by the working class in
Prussia, at the time, was without debate. The conditions under which this class lived
was complete distress. The vindication offered to the working class through “salvation”
was doubly beneficial to reifying the economic and political status quo. On the one
hand, those (which were large in number) who lived under these conditions were able to
shoulder them through a kind of artificial hope outside of the life they lived at present.
And secondly, the sin-salvation complex would naturally garner support to further give
justification to the current ruling system.
In the “Social Principles of Christianity,” Marx appears to directly attack religion
itself. But, a more careful reading will show that Marx is continuing his critique against
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the focus on the abstract. For Marx, Christianity “writes blank checks from God.”58 Tying
the economic and religious criticism into one, there is simply no concrete, empirical or
real change taking place under Christanity. A blank check from heaven, to Marx, is
“null.” It is bare, empty, nothingness, that does not change the circumstances of those
oppressed. To couch Marx’s criticism of Christanity more accurately, it is important to
note that any system which further propagates abstraction--and therefore complacency
within a hegemonic social class system--is of the same ilk and same criticism. While
Christianty has different metaphors and narratives, according to Marx, it’s another cog
in the piston of unjust capitalism.
The most important, misconceived, and novel ideas about religion in Marx is that
he criticises religion from within it’s core, and not directly head-on.59 More specifically,
as has been duly noted, Marx believed that religion is a by-product, bolstered by the
unequal social circumstances of various classes. As referenced in On the Jewish
Question, Marx does not believe that Buauer’s case for abolishing religion leads to a
true kind of emancipation. He conjects that Bauer’s argument fails to remain critical
because in a “fully developed” political state (e.g., the United States), the “Jewish
Question” is no longer a theological criticism, it is a criticism of the state itself.60 In other
words, Marx indirectly approves of the development of the political formation of the
modern state from the feudal structure of society, where tenets of theology are not
directly related to the state. Since Bauer’s argument is essentially a theological one, it
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does not go beyond what the political state has already successfully established,
namely a separation between theology and political affairs.
The crux of Marx’s criticism against religion is that it (uncoincidentally) is aligned
well into the fold of “German Philosophy,” which descends from Heaven to Earth.61 For
Marx, the most important part of philosophy--and that which is hampered by religion--is
that “man is met in the flesh,” and not from what “[they] say, imagine or conceive.”62
Religion is the pillar on which dualism stands, and it is that dualism, enacted and
weaponized by the state, that ultimately prevents real, concrete change and
development in the world.63 Religion, for Marx--the “aroma of the state”--is that which
best illustrates the perverted practice of all who believe the status quo is ordinary and
without criticism. It is the escape and hope for workers who are malnourished and
maltreated (diluted optimum, as it were), and the weapon of consciousness for the
owners who prey on the workers for bigger and wider profits.64
Why, then, does religion not only exist, but thrive? As Marx cites, in democratic
states “religiosity is par excellence.”65 To answer this, he offers a very obfuscated but
important paragraph in the “On the Jewish Question.” Those who exist in the democratic
state, do so in such a way that they are liberated and free “through the medium of the
state.”66 That is, while they are their concrete and socially situated selves, in a
democratic state, transfer themselves through the filter of the state, which results in an
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abstract and isolated individual diluted of their true “species-being.” In other words,
human beings, under traditional social contract theory, forfeit certain aspects of who
they are in order to maintain abstract concepts that establish a state or constitution.67
The input is pure, social human, the output is abstract, individual civilian. This idea not
only complements religion (in this case Christianity), according to Marx, it runs exactly
parallel. In Christianity, he argues, Christ is a mediary to God by which one finds
salvation and religious liberation. Similarly, humans find political liberation through the
state.68
Finally, there is an important, albeit terse note worth mentioning on how a
religious attitude is framed in Marx. While Marx heavily cirticicized abstractionism, he
was not against visionary thinking and hope.
Another important misconception about Marx’s attitude toward religion is
pinpointing exactly where and what the target of his criticism is. That is, when one
encounters Marx through a cursory form, there are battle cries to “revolutionize,” and
“abolish religion!” But, the word abolish specifically used throughout Marx (aufheben) is
to be understood as a transcending or overcoming, rather than a negative kind of
removal.69 As Mckinnon mentions, opium had another important trait. It opened the
mind to a new and illusory vision. These visions, while according to Marx, artificial, were
nonetheless visions of hope and utopia--heaven. Marx is far from nihilistic. The desire
and hope for something better is an important specifically human trait. Marx would
simply argue that to aufenben religion, is to redirect the energy for a better life from
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outward and in the future, to inward and at present. When this happens religion will
evaporate from the minds of those who needed it to survive.
The question which continues to surface, is whether or not, and to what extent
Marx’s views were accurate, in this case, specific to religion. The accuracy by which to
make sound judgments of Marx’s thought would be to note if religion prevails in the
political state where civil society is distinct from the state. Does the interiority of
individuals prevail in order to further an unbalanced economy? And, is religion a purely
internal affair, which contributes to exploitation through the continuous of oppressive
systems and laws?
In several respects it would be simple to see that Marx’s novel ideas hold a
significant and important interpretation of what still exists as a dualistic society reified by
the democratic state. There is certainly an abundance of material dedicated to an
economics analysis of Marx. What I will seek to evaluate is the place of religion in the
democratic state. For Marx, put simply, “the existence of religion is the existence of a
defect.”70 The source of the defect is with the democratic state promulgating the
dualistic structure of humans toward each other and themselves. Does religion in a
democratic state actually indicate the existence of defects and therefore, the economic
and political reification of the status quo? Does religion satisfy the want of those in
need, and does it serve as scapegoat to the usury of the wealthy?
Using three concrete examples in the twentieth century, I will show that this
perspective is not only incorrect, but inversely true. Religion is an important--even
essential-- component to the agitation and disruption of the political and economic
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status quo.71 David Chapell makes a very compelling case that The Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s was successful in large part due to the energy and fervor of the
religious protestors, who were motivated by more than a change of earth-bound laws
and justice. The development of a New South African constitution, post-apartheid,
utilized and depended on religious tradition and principles to overcome and reconcile
the nation together. And finally, the protest against military despotism in Latin America
was guided and led by Liberation Theology, that brought Marxist ideas together with
political protest. The last example, even depended on the thought of Marx to form its
own identity--prioritizing the needs of humans. While the outcome of these movements
did not resolve the systematic inequities on which they were premised, significant
change and progress was made.72

Part 2, Analysis
David Chappell, in Stone of Hope, at the very least, nuances many accepted
narratives of the great story that is the Civil Rights Movement. This movement is often
characterized as a cohesive political protest championed by the progressive majority of
southern blacks in harmony with liberal, northern whites. However, depicted by
Chappell, it was actually a political byproduct of “old time” religious revival. It was, in
fact, religion that fueled the unifying spirit of this movement. Religion was the potent,
unifying factor that splices through the constructed binary narratives of liberal and
71
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conservative. On the one hand, liberals—in all their institutional resistance—had no
solid foundation on which to springboard any sort of aggressive campaign against the
inequality promoted in the south.73 However, by this same token, the segregationists
lacked the same unifying factors. They could not garner a pointed theological or
ecumenical stance providing the necessary bolstering to sustain segregation.
Chappell presents a compelling thesis that essentially subverts assumed
narratives about the Civil Rights Movement. He intensifies the paradoxes and ironies
through his pointed language, describing the ‘old time religion’ as “irrational,” and
“supernatural,” albeit pragmatic and useful. This religious proclivity, inherited from the
prophets and apostles, injected protestors with an “apocalyptic” vision, in which their
demonstrations went beyond sheer political protest and a call for change. They saw
themselves simultaneously participating in an earthly and cosmic justice. The protestors
who inherited the prophetic religion of scripture understood, as did Reinhold Niebuhr
and Martin Luther King Jr., the essential disposition of humankind. As Chappell notes, a
large measure of the cohesion within the movement was due to King’s understanding of
human nature as redacted from Niebuhr. Niebuhr and King, essentially saw power as
corrupt, and therefore, understood political change to come only through “coercion.”
Hence, the Civil Rights Movement, by this religious and theological foundation, could
not resort or be reduced to participating in the political discourses of reason. That’s what
created hegemonic Jim Crow in the first place!
King’s attitude toward social reform and justice collided with his theological
proclivity, as most notably referenced in his essay on Jeremiah, “The Significant
73 David L. Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004; paperback, 2005),
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Contributions of Jeremiah to Religious Thought”. In this essay King hails Jeremiah as
rejected and isolated from society because of this strong and righteous devotion to
Yahweh.74 And that this devotion included an poignant criticism of “idolatry” committed
by the Nation of Israel. Jeremiah preached a return to justice and purity of society. To
King this amounted to “religion” disrupting the “status quo” of society. Religion’s “worst
disservice” he argues is to be “sponsors and supports” of the status quo.75 Jeremiah
was an example of what King and other civil rights activists believed was an archetypal
prophet, demonstrating not only justice-oriented outcomes for people, but, more
importantly, a complete devotion and obedience to God.
As mentioned, King’s ultimate views of theology, but specifically his attitude
toward humanity, were largely influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr, who developed what
King adopted as “Prophetic Religion.”76 This proclivity developed out of--and in many
respects, stood above--the contexts of neo-orthodoxy and liberalism. King, like Niebuhr,
had a pessimistic view of humanity, in that he believed humans required a salvific
moment to reconcile “sin.”77 At the same time, King adamantly resisted a kind of ideal
humanism, which had proven unfruitful in the present crisis.78 This is further
emphasized through King’s opposition to J. H. Jackson, who opposed King’s method of
protest, and was keen to work out black equality through the liberal project of discourse
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and ultimate trust in the foundation of the Constitution and politics.79 Yet, Jackson hailed
democracy and post-war unity as the better way to achieve a desired outcome. His
point was that “This fight [for civil rights] is more important to America as a nation than it
is to us as a race.”80 Essentially, Jackson endorsed the achievement of democracy as
that through which equity would be realized.
Through this lens, it is clear to see how King as a leader in the Civil Rights
Movement and as an ardent Prophet to Christianity held a tension between using the
forces of human created structures with the transcendent and cosmic powers of justice.
He was committed to a Niebuhrian theology that required, “a combination of this worldly
and other-worldly hopes.”81 In other words, King held a certain kind of “dialectical”
theology which held the temporary earth and eternal heavens together. Humans were
neither completely forsaken to an empty and destitute position--only passively
redeemed by the will of a mighty, powerful and removed God--nor rescued by the
powers of reason and savvy government policy. Christians, according to King, were
redeemed through salvation and called upon to enact justice, here and now, through an
eternal covenant which transcends the bounds of corporeality.
The narrative about religion in the Civil Rights Movement would not be complete
without mention of the White Southern Church. Common associated imagery includes
throngs of angry white people jesting black protestors. One may also assume a good
majority of these antisegregationalists were deeply religious. Chappell challenges this
79
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notion by noting that one great weakness of the anti-segregationist movement was the
inability of the church to take an equally combative stance as energetic black protestors.
Chappell states that “white churches were unwilling to make sacrifices to preserve
segregation. They loved other things— peace [and] social order—more. They could not
make defense of segregation the unifying principle of their culture.”82 White churches,
against misconceived ideas, did not take the necessary active protest for a continuance
of segregation, like their adamant political counterparts. White Christian laypersons
generally were not outspoken activists who felt that their fervent participation in the
segregationist movement was an essential part of the faithfulness to God.83 In short, the
religious activity and energy of the white southern churches to back the segregationist
agenda was completely outmatched by the prophetic religion and protest of the Black
churches. Even with a minority in numbers, the fervency and passion of the black
church energized and sustained the Civil Rights Movement.
A particular reading of Chappell would suggest that God was on the side of the
minority of Black protestor-revivalists. While both churches--the black and white--were,
in formal respects, equally “religious,” the black church was active, energetic, motivated,
and determined. The manifestations of which resulted in fierce and powerful protests
that were relentless in the demand and fruition of political and social change. The
source of this “prophetic religion’s” energy and motivation--against the Marxist
paradigm--came from outside the human source of reason. It was a transcendent belief
that “love is the most durable power in the world...and the most potent instrument
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available in mankind’s quest for peace and security.”84 King’s theology and philosophy
combined both transcendent ideas and pragmatic action. He and his followers (at least
to some degree) believed that to accomplish their goals they could not return hate with
hate. And in doing so, they were, at the same time, faithfully abiding in the mission of
their service to God. Implementing this strategy led to a successful endeavor. In this
specific example, a microcosm to social progress, achieved a degree of what Marx may
have had in mind for change. But the source and means by which that was achieved,
was ironically through extraneous, religious ideas.
Because Communism was a cultural talking point of King’s day, and because
King himself was a socialist and ‘revolutionist,’ he duly noted his thoughts on Marx and
Communism in Strength to Love. For King, “the success of communism in the world
today is due to the failure of Christians to live up to the highest ethical tenets inherent in
its system.”85 Despite his adamant distinction between Communism and Christianity,
King was more ambiguous about the ends to which both sought to achieve. The
essential difference for King was that Communism held its ultimate belief in the state
and that the means to achieving social and economic equality were vastly at odds.86 But
it is clear that King and Marx shared a critical view of capitalism’s tendency toward
exploitation and inequality. Even going so far as to find a similar criticism of the church
with tendencies to be only “opiate of the people.”87 But perhaps most paralleled is the
kind of dualism Marx speaks of with regard to religion. Recalling what was previously
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mentioned, Marx holds that religion in the democratic state, perfects the “egoist man,”
that exists in a kind of dualistic paradigm, where the interior and exterior life are
separated. King similarly articulates this attitude with the church at large stating,
“Christianity is a Sunday activity having no relevance for Monday, and the church is little
more than a secular social club having a thin veneer of religiosity.”88 Without directly
articulating his point, it is clear that King, unlike, Marx did not see this as Christianity or
religion at all.
On this point is where King’s theology and practice diverge from the theory of
Marx. Marx insists that religion is a passive and reactive proclivity because of something
else--namely, the circumstances of capitalism and the detriment and exploitation of
within its grip. Religion is a secondary effect to the world. For King, there is a clear
distinction between this kind of passive and reactive religion and the “prophetic religion”
of Jeremiah the prophet (and Civil Rights protestors). The former is that which is
practiced by the church at large, but especially white southern churches. For King, this
is one shy step away from no religious practice at all. The religiosity of which Marx
speaks is very akin to the white southern bourgeois religion referred to by King.
Ironically however, in a certain respect, King and Marx would agree that this religion
carries with it an inauthenticity because of its function as a cog in the engine of the
state. Similarly, they would agree that a revolution is needed to curb the systematic
inequality of the state. The central difference is that Marx’s fuel and catalyst for
accomplishing this is turning inward, and King’s is turning upward. In the end, King and
the Civil Rights Leaders proved that a transcendent religiosity can fuel a needed change
in the systematic injustice of a state.
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The South African Council of Churches during the late 20th century antiapartheid movement is the second example that will be examined in analyzing Marx’s
ideas on religion and politics. The role of organized, peaceful, civil disobedience has its
roots well before the late 20th century. Mahatma Gandhi in the late 19th century led
several protests against the systematic oppression of the native Indian workers. The
crux of his protest was initiated by the prohibition from Indians to Transvaal.89
Eventually Gandhi and participants were arrested for their actions. But taking workers
away from the work naturally caused a lag in production, specifically in the mines where
Indian workers labored.90 An important note to this context, is that civil disobedience
was only sometimes an isolated act of protest. Commonly, though, these acts were
strategic moves that turned the state on its head, especially with regard to production
and labor.
In the middle of the twentieth century, the policy of Apartheid confronted the
church head on. The Dutch Reformed Church largely comprising the Church Congress,
supported the Apartheid laws, stating that “Bantu tribes..would experience a happy and
prosperous future,” through the establishment of these laws.91 No sooner had large
established churches formally opposed the laws and endorsements from the
government-tied church organization. However, the point at which church resistance
and disobedience began to materialize was when a “mixed worship” prohibition
movement was beginning to form. Churches generally decided to deliberately and
formally forgo adherence to the law. In one particular instant, Archbishop Clayton had
cited that he and his congregants would be disobedient to God if they were obedient to
89
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the law.92 The vehement opposition to such laws led the government to wane the
attempts to formalize and enforce such laws with fidelity and scale.
However, the most predominant instances in which the church was a catalyst for
organized resistance and disruption came in the 1980s. Derrick K. Hudson-Allision
makes a compelling case that a two-fold strategy led to successful protest, and
eventually change in government. The first being a mobilized black labor force
disengaging from economic production, which stymied the South African economy.
Secondly, Hudson-Allison attributes the sustenance of this labor movement through a
faith-infused “prophetic expression.”93 The two strategies together, he claims, ultimately
pushed the existing government to fold.
While obvious, to some degree, it should not go without noting that the Dutch
Reformed Church was a major--if not necessary--ally in the apartheid government.
However, church endorsed and sanctioned oppressive regimes have always existed.94
According to the work of Charles Villa Vicencio, two distinct Western Christian traditions
exist--at least in its relationship to politics and the state. The “dominant” tradition,
according to Villa-Vicencio, aligns itself to the state and “will not challenge it, unless all
other options are exhausted.”95 Naturally, the church has found itself actively, or
passively supporting oppressive regimes.96 The other theological framework is the
“alternative tradition,” which is marked by unwavering advocacy of the poor and
oppressed. The tradition of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) was fueled
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by this “alternative tradition,” seeking to dispel an oppressive government regime
through civil disobedience and organized resistance tactics.
Before surveying some of the concrete examples of how the black labor force
and the SACC collaborated to achieve successful regime change, there’s an important
point to consider in context of this larger work. There is a clear common outcome
desired by both the Marxist and a Civil Rights activist (among other activists in this
case); namely, the revolution of government to change laws and systems that
systematically oppress the poor and disenfranchised. For Marx, this manifests in a
violent overthrow of the bourgeois.”97 A recognition of egregious oppression and
exploitation of labor, the proletariat removes the bourgeois ruling class through force-much in the same way were held in their position. Through a revolution supported and
energized by the church, this takes on a different form. Though often termed “nonviolent,” and while the SACC did not endorse and support armed resistance, the
resistance was a forceful disruption and agitation to the state. But prior to the 1980s,
this was not the case. The militant branch of the African National Congress (ANC) had
for thirty years prior engaged in violent tactics in an effort to secure rights and equality
for blacks in South Africa.98 Eventually however, the ANC had come to recognize the
inability for this kind of movement to find success.99 Out of this recognition was born an
organized movement to non-violent resistance, which was “sustained” by the Council of
Churches.
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The non-violent and disruptive tactics performed by the working class black
population were targeted and strategic. One vital and effective non-violent tactic was
massive boycotts of the black labor force. Because the South African economy was so
dependent on the labor of blacks, these boycotts severely impacted the manufacturing
sector in the country. Furthermore, the movement was so ubiquitous and powerful that it
could not be contained or extinguished by the government.100 Other tactics came into
direct conflict with the church, coercing it directly into the political arena. Namely,
conscientious objectors to military service. While the church and church denominations
were more or less fluid on the role of service to the military, the infringement on the
“right to religious freedom” in the form of conscientious objection, was generally held as
an indispensable part of commitment to one’s faith. Similarly, laws prohibiting “mixed
marriages” brought the church directly into the fold of political conflict. In 1981 the
Presbyterian Church formally gave ministers authority to break what was, at the time,
the law of the land.101 While these instances were not of relative significance, they are
illustrative to the larger movement taking place within the role of the church in the
dismantling of the apartheid government.
The SACC and church involvement at large, in the South African Revolution, was
in part birthed out of the Vatican II Council, which largely emphasized pursuance of
social justice, economic equality, and an overarching concern for the “poor” and
disenfranchised.102 The conviction of this council was that the catholic church has a
responsibility to involve itself in the concrete emancipation and freedom for those
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oppressed.103 Hallmarks of this movement include the longstanding coined theological
phrase, “preferential option for the poor.” Through this formal declaration, roots were
formed which established liberation theologies often practiced, but not limited to Latin
America. Two other formal theological South African influences include the Christian
Institute, established by reverend Naude of the Dutch Reformed Church and the
Institute for Contextual Theology. The former was established in an effort to secure
support from within the Dutch White Church to find the meaning of the gospel to
advocate on behalf of the poor. Naude’s conviction was that this was to be achieved
through broader political participation and power granted to the black population in
South Africa.104 Finally, the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT) propagated the idea
that theology was “to be done in real life in the world.”105 In other words, the church and
theological convictions were most--if not only--meaningful by the ways in which it is
applied in concrete liberation. The ICT not only retroactively attributed transcendent
meaning to those fighting the apartheid regime, it fueled the movement up through the
change of government.
The SACC, in many ways, served as an important practical and organizational
pillar on which the non-violent anti-aprtheid movement could lean. The church provided
shelter and food when people’s homes were demolished in the wake of government
crack-downs.106 Churches also served as important hubs for organization leaders to
meet and mobilize their efforts. Furthermore, the church was also a large and visible
organization that was a government threat simply by the sheer magnitude of its
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influence. However, more importantly--at least in terms of the broader movement itself-the church was the invisible fuel that gave activists the will and energy to carry forth
their mission. Desmund Tutu, among others, were the manifestation of the church
inserting itself directly into the political area. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
speech (but in many other places), Tutu says “When will we learn that human beings
are of infinite value because they have been created in the image of God, and that it is a
blasphemy to treat them as if they were less than this and to do so ultimately recoils on
those who do this?”107 Here, a clear and forceful notion is made that unified the nonviolent anti-apartheid movement. A transcendent origin of human species reveals that
unjust and unequal laws cannot be reasonable but also cannot be truly religious-something the apartheid government (and other governments, past and present) had
needed to justify.
Subsequently, church leaders became the direct targets of government and the
martyrs of the movement.108 The ensuing actions only further mobilized and energized
non-violent resistance against the government. The largest peace protest for several
decades was led by church leaders shortly thereafter. And finally, less than two years
later, the government began negotiations with the ANC, which led a government regime
change in 1994.
Hudson-Allison makes a strong case that even though concrete economic
circumstances give rise to, and are often ameliorate socio-political conflict, “materialistic
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determinism often slights nonmaterial motivations.”109 It is evident that the church at
large in the South African Revolution was an essential component to the continuance of
a successful, impactful, and longstanding protest against the government. HudsonAllison notes that the three essential functions the church played in this way include:
“institutional stability and moral authority, capacity for empowering individuals to act,
and a commitment to non-violence.”110 The church acting as an important agent for how
protest should be conducted provided an overarching ethic, which enabled the church to
curtail violent resistances, for instance. Because the church is an intermediary to the
transcendent, it provided the opportunity for activists to engage in activities that were
not necessarily dependent on a certain outcome. If one was protesting in obedience to
God and to the cause for justice, then the outcome was of secondary importance. This
kind of motivating tactic enabled relentless efforts. And finally, the church maintained a
commitment to non-violent strategies, which paralyzed the government from fighting
against it with the forceful justification it could have, should it have been threatened with
force. These together made the SACC a vital piece to the revolution.
The final and most relevant example to be explicated and analyzed is the
Liberation Theology movement, most notable in Latin America. The reason this example
is the most relevant is because this movement--uncoincidentally taking place during the
Cold War--finds direct influence, even correlation, with Marxism. Here Latin American
theologians make a strong convergence of Marx’s social critique and theology. The
outcome is a Theology of Liberation.111 In this section I will diverge to examine, more
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abstractly, just how these two discourses are correlated. Boff’s work is especially
signicant in context of the other two examples by the nature of the endeavor.
The intent of Boff’s project is to more-or-less, provide a systematic voice to the
work of Liberation that has been taking place. He seeks to provide an epistemological
backbone to the work taking place among active theologies. To put it in his terms, he
sets off to “capture theology of the political’s ‘material substance.’”112 Theology’s turn to
the social sciences is abruptly necessitated by the brute fact of human beings’ location
in concrete reality, determined by historical situation and circumstance--a Marxist
axiom. Jon Sobrino would describe this phenomenon as the “awaking from the sleep of
inhumanity.”113 Sobrino parallels this theological movement in the same way Kant’s
famous work, Critique of Pure Reason, awoke humanity from the slumber of
dogmatism. In the same fashion, in a post-Marxian era, knowledge in general--theology
especially--cannot overlook the realities of the human situation in the world. Moreover,
that Christians themselves find concerning the concrete realities that directly affect the
“ontic potential” of human beings further necessitates a need for theology to enfold the
social situation into itself.114 However, this must be carefully, systematically, and
methodologically done so that theology can operate in concrete reality but also sustain
intellectual integrity. In this sense, Boff turns to the social sciences, which have already
done heavy lifting in terms of effectively articulating the human situation in the world.
Boff takes measure to warn against a theology that omits a mediated dynamic
between theology and the political. The theology of this kind he names as “empty
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theorism.” It’s a theology that produces an “overabundance of signification for its own
sake.” It blatantly ignores the “scandal” of the poor and oppressed.115 Elsa Tamez
provides an important example of how this theological tendency operates from a biblical
standpoint. She argues that the common “justification by grace through faith,” should
not be understood from an abstract notion of sin, but one enriched by the context of the
time it was written and also contextualized for people now in the same way. She argues
that the poor who first read this would not have understood the abstract notion of sin in
the first place. Therefore, it is not only more theologically sound to apply this concretely
than abstractly, but also more relevant. The sinner’s guilt relief is not enough to address
the manifestation of Latin America’s “structural sin,” that which is an egregious offense
to God, according to Tamez.116
Boff strongly contends that speculative theology (and philosophy) is outright
anachronistic. The emergence of the social sciences—which is ultimately a
conscientious, introspective observance of society itself—gives name and voice to a
social problem. For theology to regain a relevant and viable discourse, it, according to
Boff, needs to, in one sense, envelop Marx’s critique of religion and in another sense,
circumvent what Marx implies is an intrinsic determination of religion (in this case,
theology). This critique of religion and theology, more specifically, is relevant to Boff’s
project because in a strong sense, Marx and Boff have similar critiques. The difference
is that Boff seeks to rescue theology from its irrelevant tendencies to ignore concrete
problems of reality, where Marx holds that theology’s implicit motive is to mystify the
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problems of reality in order to sustain the status quo of class power.117 Muller mentions
that liberation theology assumes an aspect of Marxian analysis of the human situation in
the sense that the human being is directly and absolutely conjoined to the historical
situation in which they exist. Theory is an attempt to retain the status quo through
abstractionism.118 As mentioned in Part I, Marx claims that theology has an “inverted”
view of the world by approaching ultimate problems from a top-down, abstract and
mystical realm, rather than from the concrete situation people faced every day.119
Boff’s response to this critique is dynamic, or more particularly, dialectical. He
understands the Marxian critique presenting social science with two conflicting realms:
one based on empiricism (concerned with truth) and the other idealistic (concerned with
justice).120 Theology of the political, as one that involves and revolves around praxis,
must encompass both realms. He names these distinct, but important facets
“autonomous” and “dependent.” Theology of the Political must operate autonomously in
the sense that it abides by its law, vernacular, and rules. Its proper object is a
“theoretical God;” one contemplated by theologians. Nonetheless, Theology of the
Political subsumes the material rendered by the social sciences. The “believing”
Christian is a historical being, situated in society, and therefore must find its material
object there, too.121 This kind of theology, to claim any sort of intellectual integrity, and
to be ‘pertinent’, needs to be active—it needs to be “full throttle, dialectic.”122
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If, according to Boff, Theology of the Political will exist, it must consider and
consult the sciences of the social, not simply ‘the social.’ In other words, Boff clarifies
why exactly Theology of the Political is to assume a dialectical character rather than
operate singularly on it’s own terms.123 His primary response, here, is that there is no
unmediated science.124 Theology, according to Boff, does not have at its disposal the
ability to ascertain the “real” as given—what is metaphysically speaking, a divine
purview. To elucidate this point, Boff constructs various “degrees” of knowledge of the
real. The first consists of the divine purview just mentioned, where the real is simply
given and seen directly. One degree of knowledge is the “common sense” or everyday
kind of knowledge of the real. The third degree is where the sciences of the social
dissect and extrapolate information of the social not immediately known. The fourth
degree of knowledge is the activity (praxis) of the theology of the political.125
Theology cannot see itself as having direct access to the empirically ‘real’ or
suspend itself as having a totalizing discourse. Therefore, it must rely on social analysis
to provide it with “raw material.” This manifests in a “constitutive” relationship between
theology and the social sciences. While first theology, according to Boff, can maintain
an “application” based relationship to the social sciences—that is, a relationship where
each respective discipline operates independent of the other—a second theology is
constitutive. It functions as interplay, where each exchanges terms and value to the
other.126 Theology of the Political—by its own name—bears this kind of relationship:
Theology of the Political.
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Moreover, in Chapter Two Boff makes clear that theology’s character is one that
is active, dynamic and fluid. The constitutive relationship between the political and
theology demonstrates that theology is itself a “labor of production.” Second theology
subsumes the objects of its inquiry and turns them theological, what Boff calls
theology’s “second voice.”127 This point of Boff’s is imperative in making an
epistemological claim. If theology is itself a movement, its epistemological nature
changes. It is also notable that this bolsters theology’s intellectual and academic status
as a science, albeit, a different type of science. The true epistemological aim of this
work is to give systematic articulation of what has been a common thread in liberation
theologies hitherto. Gutierrez specifies that the divine salvation story—which was
practiced in the early church and has since lost its way—is reduced when it is not
considered as a part of the unfolding of history. A “guaranteeing of heaven” is not a
complete picture of God’s salvation.128 Boff’s project is to nuance and structure these
tenets articulated among many Liberation Theology scholars.
Having established the dynamic relationship between Theology of the Political
and the social sciences, Boff fends off an important and double-sided objection, namely,
the “idealization of faith.” One side of this objection claims that theology, when
performed and practiced in the concrete world of the real, can reduce itself to political
ideologies, void of the divine transcendent aspect. On the other side of this objection,
however, is a potential danger of contemplative faith (first theology) to obsess itself with
“transcendent” ideas, thus bracketing itself from the real world.129 Boff’s response to the
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objection and danger is in line with his dialectical approach hitherto. Theology of the
Political must, by definition, attend to the transcendent while simultaneously recognizing
that its operative objects (human beings) are themselves situated in a concrete reality.
For Boff, to present a sound epistemological theology, both a first and second theology
need to work in tandem. One cannot replace the other, neither can one supersede or
impose itself over the other. The danger of doing so—as has been the accusation
against Liberation Theology, for example—can lead to the “ideolization of the faith.”
Equally dangerous, is the already iterated Marxian critique of theology (first theology),
which alienates the world’s concrete problems through abstraction. As Boff says,
“theology of the political respects…the transcendence of faith only to the extent that
it…[acknowledges] its particularity according to the particularity of its historical
condition.”130
But still, theology seems to carry with it an “absolute” or ultimate element
intrinsically connected to its work. Again, Boff makes clear that in its dialectical nature,
Theology of the Political operates “practically” and “theoretically,” or in this case in the
essence of faith and the existence of faith.131 In a Hegelian sense, Boff does not see the
various binaries of Theology of the Political in opposition. In this system (at least), they
work cohesively. The absolute and abstract (essence) elements of faith express
themselves in the concrete reality (existence) of faith. In reference to the question of
theology’s ‘absolute’ scope, Boff takes the following stance: “Theology is not absolute
discourse. It is discourse of the Absolute.”132 Theology, as such, working in reality,
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extracts the limited concrete material and opens it to a vertical transcendent reality. This
is how Boff adequately clarifies the objection stated above and how he refers to
Theology of the Political as a “regional discourse” and universal discourse.”133
The final chapter of Part I, Boff seeks to clearly and distinctly mark the
boundaries of social sciences and theological discourse. Issuing the limitations and
distinct confines of social scientific inquiry is one of two important facets of the
discussion of the social-analytic mediation. In so doing, he allows each respective
discourse to have its say, but only within the limits it ought to be producing conclusive
statements. Only after establishing the precincts of sciences, can that given science be
considered in total. In other words, science can be utilized by theology when
theologians know science’s limitations. Respectively, theologians can perform their
tasks without infringing on other disciplines by claiming absolute dominion within the
nature of the discourse. The theologian’s positive task is to pronounce a method for the
concrete human being to connect to a universal and absolute transcendence. In this
final chapter of Part II, Boff articulates this important relationship.
To conclude a summary of Part I of Boff’s work, it will be worth noting an
important aspect of the human being with regard to Liberation Theology. Echoing Marx,
Liberation Theology reworks the ontology of the human being from a theological
perspective. Nowhere is this reworking taken more seriously than in Sobino’s Principal
of Mercy. Sobrino makes the strong case that “mercy” is at the heart of God’s proclivity
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to humankind and, thus, should be mimicked by the Catholic Church.134 Ensuring that
human beings are able to fulfill their ontic potential is and should be the mission of the
church. When Jesus was asked how one is to fulfill the greatest commandment, says
Sobrino, he tells them the story of a man who has pity and “re-acts” to that suffering of
another.135 The realization of what Sobrino calls “the total human being,” is the essential
mission of the Christian Church. Sustaining the abstract notions of theology only serves
to reify systems that “crucify” and propel and produce fragmented human beings.136
In concretizing the relationship between the social-analytic mediation and
theology, Boff considers a “code” that this dynamic should abide by. And further, this
code is governed by the principles of “autonomy” and “anti-dogmatism.”137 The former is
the positive approach of the sciences, where a given discipline functions by its rules in
relation to its object. The latter is the negative, or cautioned aspect, where the
disciplines can speak of conclusions confined to their circles of domain. Penetrating the
limits of a discipline’s confines breaches the integrity of knowledge and epistemology.
The example Boff provides, in relation to theology, is that of deus ex machina: that
theology should avoid making the case for scientific miracles because it does not align
with the conclusions of modern scientific discourse, and because science lies outside of
theology’s scope.138 This does not mean, however, that theology is stymied, or stopped
in its tracks. To Boff’s point exactly, theology’s labor of production, reorganizes itself—in
this particular case, “demythologizes”—so that it can provide positive and important
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insights to Christian communities within its “regional discourse.” In the Hegelian spirit,
theology starts when, in some respects, it ends.
Furthermore, social scientific discourses cannot absolutize their statements
either. According to Boff, the Marxian critique of the society is legitimate only in one
sense: it’s “scientific aspect.” It’s philosophical aspect, the “all-explaining”
Weltanschauung, does not hold according to the code established by Boff.139 More
specifically, Marx’s critique of society is useful for theologians, political scientists, and
academic psychology, et al. But, for Marx’s conclusions to find any sort of absolute
declaration is beyond its scope. Marxism derives its conclusions on the principles that
are verified in history. But history is a constant development, therefore, not allowing for
an ultimate claim to be made, because, under this condition, verification is itself,
ongoing.140
The ultimate point being that the code for the relationship between the socialanalytic and Theology of the Political is carefully drawn out by Boff. Its nature is
dialectical, and its purpose is both to circumscribe and to cultivate. Scientific discourse,
whether theology or something different, will thrive when it’s function and operation are
within its particular purview. As Boff duly notes, when theology knows its limits it is a
sign and signifier of the status of its “epistemological health.”141 He is doctoring a
plethora of Liberation Theology that’s epistemological foundation is struggling to sink its
footing. Part of the reason for this will be parsed out in the final section of his work, but
what makes this an especially difficult task is that Theology of the Political has a moving
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target. Theologians such as Severino Croatto and Leonardo Boff, and others discuss
Liberation Theology as a movement. Croatto discusses this in terms of biblical studies
having a dynamic rather than static character.142 Leonardo Boff discusses this same
phenomenon with regard to the Spirit’s movement through history. That Christianity has
become attuned to the cries of the poor and to render a theological articulation of
attending to these cries is the challenge for theologians.143 Clodovis Boff is making the
most focused attempt in doing just that through the project at hand.

Conclusion
In conclusion of this project, I discuss two important points. The first will cover the
major distinctions between Marx and “Prophetic/Contextual/Liberation Theology.”
Secondly, I will seek to address points in which Marx and these ‘active’ theologies
converge. It will become apparent, against common understanding, that Marx and the
religious activities in these groups had more in common than at first would be apparent.
One of Marx’s strongest criticisms of religion is with regard to what he calls the
inverted consciousness. Again, he contends that religion is erected to address real
problems with transcendent (unreal) solutions, outside of the world.144 He ultimately
makes a powerful case that theology and God can be a root cause to alienation of
individuals, most essentially by doubly legitimizing the positions of the oppressors and
mitigating the revolt of the oppressed by sciphening distress and torment toward airy
ideas about heaven and redemption. Most prominently mentioned in the “Social
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principles of Christianity,” where he claims that oppressive rulers “transfer....settlement
of all infamies to heaven, and thereby justify the continuation of these infamies on
earth.”145 Essentially religion for “eighteen hundred years” has used systematically
abstracted liberties and rights to life from the oppressed. On the one side, it has used it
to legitimize its claim and sustain its power, and on the other hand, keep the oppressed
in their place through heavenly hope.146
However, even in this major point of divergence, Marx and Liberation Theologies
both can agree on the point mentioned above. In all three stated examples, each was
combating a form of religion reifying oppressive systems. In the case of the Civil Rights
Movement, segregationists appealed to biblical texts to support the separation (and
ultimately the supremacy of whiteness)147 In South Africa the Dutch Reformed church
was the central organization purporting the continued “social order” of Aprtheid. And,
Latin American Liberation Theology’s anthem often cries foul against theology that does
not act against real-world injustices and oppression. Therefore, in many clear respects
even on this issue, religion cries foul against a distorted or perverted version of itself.
In turning to the ways in which Marx and religion converge. The first and perhaps
most apparent, is the call to achieve liberation/justice in the world. Beyond this general
commonality, both Marx and these religious movements took specific aim directly at the
church which came alongside oppressive government powers. As mentioned above,
segregationists, the Dutch Reformed Church and at times the Catholic Church in Latin
America, bolstered the justification of the government--and its subsequent tactics to
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secure its grip on power. In modern nation states, according to Marx, the production of
goods through the abstraction of human labor (disconnectedness of human work from
the material) is supported by “Protestantism.”148 Marx believed that the American form
of Christanity was especially suited to support a kind of economic dualism, where mind
and body were disparate entities. It was against this abstractionism through religion that
he ultimately criticised.
Ironically, while Marx’s arguments against religion were themselves quite
theoretical and abstract, the late 20th century religious movements critiqued religion
from within with a more intuitive and direct approach. While these movements, without
question, vehemently critiqued the religious establishments that supported oppressive
regimes, for the purposes of the projects, it is most important to note that they took
acute aim at the structure of the system itself--i.e., capitalism. Martin Luther King Jr. did
not shy away from asserting himself as a socialist economically. In his speech,
“Pilgrimage to Non-violence,” he says:
The gospel at its best deals with the whole man, not only his soul but his
body, not only his spiritual well-being, but his material well-being. Any
religion that professes to be concerned about the souls of men and is not
concerned about the slums that damn them, the economic conditions that
strangle them and the social conditions that cripple them is a spiritually
moribund religion awaiting burial149
Similarly, Contextual Theology appeals to the situated human species in the world as an
intuitive basis to find liberation not only in a transcendent way, but in a real and
important way on earth.
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Perhaps the most important and overlooked similarity between Marx and
Prophetic Religion is the role transcendence holds in social liberation and revolution.
While obvious that this principle exists in the examples stated above, it is important to
briefly summarize Boff’s work, which provides Liberation Theology a systematic
backbone, connecting concrete praxis and abstract theology. What Boff essentially
states is that social science provides the material substance for theology's endeavors.
In Boff’s words, the practical drives the theoretical; “theory represents practice.”150 The
dangers of theorism and abstractionism are markley voiced through Boff’s work as well
as other Liberation Theology writers. Together these opposition voices with Marx, more
or less claim that omitting the real and concrete distress of people leads to runaway
theorism--or in Marx’s case abstractionism. A notable difference is that Marx believes
liberation will render religion obsolete, and Liberation theology holds that liberation will
fulfill religion.151
Less obvious is where a transcendent principle exists in Marx’s writings.
However, there are two points worth noting in Marx that suggests he held to an
underlying, even abstract, principle. The first is the passage from A Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right, in response to Marx’s own hypothetical question: “From where is
the positive possibility of German emancipation?”152 His answer, as Mckinnon notes, is
reminiscent of Hegel’s Master-Slave dynamic, and deeply dialectical.153 Marx writes:
In the formulation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society
which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all
estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering
150
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and claims no particular right because no particular wrong, but wrong
generally, is perpetuated against it; which can invoke no historical, but
only human, title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the
consequences but in all-round antithesis to the premises of German
statehood; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without
emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby
emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the
complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete
re-winning of man.154
In this passage, “dissolution” [aufhebung] is not to be understood as disregarded or
eliminated, but rather, in Hegelian terms, transcended--overcome to bring about
something new. The oppression and “chains” of those referred to by Marx, is discussed
in the abstract and universal. In large respects the fact of the “chains” opens the
imagination to a hope and outcomes that not only is without chains, but with something
more positive and not yet manifest.
Actively working through suffering and toward realizing something new and
unimagined, through hope, is an idea closely parallel to the idea of suffering and
redemption found in the New Testament gospel narratives. The cross represents both
real and present suffering and redemption together. The symbol of the cross carries
both the idea of ultimate suffering and death, and salvation and victory over death.155
Taken in context, this universal suffering and hope fueled a passion for prophetical
religion and theologies associated with political revolution, understanding both shared
hope and suffering.
It is on this principle, found both in Marx and in liberation theology, where Marx
fails to fully grasp the power and foundation of religion in society. The principle of
transcendence [aufhebung] discussed in Marx could have found sympathies with
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religious movements, and even with religious symbols. Marx adequately provides a
thorough analysis and explication of religion, which directly and indirectly reifies the
powers of government. But he (mostly) fails to adequately provide a competing analysis
for religion that serves as a catalyst to ultimately undo these powers. Certainly, these
movements do not reach the complete level of “human emancipation” which Marx had
fully envisioned. They do, however, move the needle further in that direction, in way that
non-religious movements had
It is not surprising then, to see Marx and his counterpart, Fredrich Engels find
sympathies with the early Christians revolutionary character, which unfortunately is
fragmented.156 Marx’s claims against religion and it’s reinforcement of an oppressive
state through faulty reasoning are, to a high degree, supported by history and
contemporary manifestations of religion. However, what goes unaddressed (until
potentially the very near end of his life) is that while religion does refiy systems, it can
and does, at the same time, serve as an essential catalyst to social revolutions and
change. Key to the energy that drives this motivation is described by Marx himself:
“certainty of victory.” That victory came through the act of participating in the movement
toward justice, not the outcome itself. It drove protestors to non-violently work and fight
through a transcendent hope.
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